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Abstract
Background: Through the extensive use of public media, the government of England was heavily involved in encouraging 
and instructing people on how to manage their life during coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). This model of health 
emergency governance replicates the practice of ‘calculative technologies’ and ‘bio-politics’ embedded in population 
management. Previous research on COVID-19 governance both in the United Kingdom and beyond provides varied 
revelations on broader ‘technologies of government’ and bio-politics by numerous governments. However, rarely have 
any studies explicitly and distinctively highlighted the unique ‘calculative technologies’ mobilised by governments within 
their bio-politically designed “technologies of government” to compel the populations to manage their lives under their 
COVID-19 guidance. The paper therefor examines how the UK government deployed “calculative technologies,” as part 
of its strategies of health governance and governmentality during the first wave of COVID-19 in England. 
Methods: This study uses document analysis as its data collection method. Its review includes documents, press releases, 
social media disclosures and health guidance issued by the UK government from March to December, 2020. The data are 
analysed employing the Foucault’s governmentality and bio-political scholarship.
Results: The paper’s findings reveal the UK government’s use of integrated calculative technologies of self-governance 
in the form of risk calculations and metrices/statistics (eg, death tolls, infection rates), performance management (eg, 
two metre social distancing, and hand washing for twenty seconds) and discipline and control (eg, fourteen days self-
isolation), in addition to a more conventional top-down, managerial decision-making process adopted in the past. 
By these newly initiated “calculative technologies,” the government has “bio-politically” governed the behaviours 
and lifestyles of vulnerable community members, health workers and general public at a distance, inculcating self-
management and individualisation of responsibility. 
Conclusion: The newly adopted calculative technologies used by the UK government created a multi-faceted discourse 
of obligations, entitlements and scale of engagement, and facilitated directions about what people should do to protect 
themselves and others from the spread of the virus. Overall, the overtly and idiosyncratically used calculative technologies 
resemble a unique ‘art of government’ and produce a set of ‘bio-political’ interventions enforcing the populations to 
manage their own wellbeing and governing them at a distance during COVID-19. 
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Background
This paper examines how the UK government deployed 
calculative technologies to govern citizens during the first 
wave of COVID-19 in England. The previous researches on 
governmentality and the bio-politics of COVID-19 in the 
United Kingdom and other countries ignore the importance 
of calculative technologies in population governance during 
a pandemic, as elaborated in this paper. Previous studies on 
COVID-19 governance in the United Kingdom1-4 limit their 
focus toward the managerial and decision-making effectiveness 
of the UK government, including preparedness and responses, 
crisis management, performance communication and 
accounting and accountability, and overlook the explicit and 
distinctive connection between calculative technologies and 
bio-political aspects of population governance. For example, 
Joyce2 examines the preparedness for the pandemic in respect 
of the capacity for surveillance, governance and coordination 
structures and the modes of crisis management used by the 
UK government. Ahmad et al1 explore the UK government’s 
strategies executed for governing the population at a distance, 
specifically the COVID-19 testing policies and underlying 
policy rationale. Their analysis merely reveals how the testing 
targets were set, operationalized and used as a performance 
communication mechanism. Moreover, Ahrens and Ferry3 
use the Foucauldian notion of ‘normalisation’ to reveal 
the role of accounting, eg, monthly statistical reporting, 
financial reporting and budgeting flexibilities in establishing 
the operational accountability of the government regarding 
regularity, probity, value for money and fairness. All these 
studies reveal some calculative technologies used by the UK 
government but ended up focussing merely on managerial 
effectiveness rather than bio-political implications. On the 
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Implications for policy makers
• Calculative accounts/matrices, technologies and instruments play an important role in the politics of daily life, and they made the government’s 
health emergency governance discourse visible and measurable for the public, particularly during the pandemic. 
• Those governing throughout health crises should endeavour to enact better ‘health and recovery’ rather than overly using ‘self ’ governance 
strategies to politically control the population.
• It is important to establish specific bio-political techniques, instruments and policies to target vulnerable communities, ie, ethnic minority 
groups, in order that they are ‘equitably’ treated during the pandemic.
Implications for the public
With decades of neo-liberal encroachment through policy reforms and austerity measures, a succession of UK governments has allocated inadequate 
funding and investment in the National Health Service (NHS). This has made them unprepared for high-impact healthcare emergency situations such 
as that created by coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The constructively built ‘bio-policies’ with tailor made calculative technologies, including 
instruments and metrices, as well as greater awareness and advocacy, can help citizens, particularly vulnerable people living with inherited life risks, 
to gain better protection and life expectancy as equal citizens of society during such emergency situations. However, the vulnerable populations 
and disadvantaged groups, ie, ethnic minority backgrounds (BAME – Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic), have been further marginalized and are 
facing increased obstacles in terms of receiving the necessary care and treatment due to the application of “calculative technologies” to shape health 
behaviours. 
Key Messages 
other hand, by analysing the stories of the COVID-19 public 
health catastrophe (the death of over 57 600 and C19 death 
certificates), and the public relations exercise by the UK 
government, Morgan4 reflects how culture (in the form of 
figurative expression) is able to directly impinge on political 
process, public behaviour, and control over the spread of the 
virus, but misses its link with calculative technologies. 
Similar researches beyond the United Kingdom also neglect 
the importance of explicit and distinguishing calculative 
technologies in governing populations. Instead their works 
largely refer to broader governance technologies, such as 
a complex set of ‘liberal’ and/or ‘coercive’ technologies that 
are used to rationalise the political power of governments.5-10 
For instance, through the genealogical analysis of COVID-19 
bio-politics, Marinković and Major9 recognize first, the 
transformation of the old biological regime and the emergence 
of the ‘gaze’ as a technology of power/knowledge, and then 
the emergence of biopolitical power over life and the central 
problem of instability in a ‘new normalcy’ without explicit 
reference to specific calculative technologies. Applying a 
triad of concepts – sovereignty, governmentality, and post-
liberalism analysis of a corona-imposed state of emergency 
in Estonia and Finland – Makarychev and Romashko5 report 
how biopolitical anti-crisis management techniques are used 
to persuade people to sacrifice personal liberties for the sake 
of public safety. Closer to the current study, Gjerde6,7 utilizes 
the governmentality studies and a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis to report the Norwegian government’s two responses 
to COVID-19, initially the articulation of a liberal rationality 
and later replaced by an interventionist bio-political approach 
that restricts freedoms and economic progress in favour of 
safeguarding the health of the population. Gjerde7 specifically 
uncovers the mentalities and broader technologies of power 
employed by the Norwegian government as it attempts to 
control the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, Giritli Nygren 
and Olofsson8 show how the normally risk averse and cautious 
Swedish government employed what some considered a 
soft and irresponsible approach during the pandemic with 
a greater exercise of power and authority, eg, disciplining 
and policing,11-14 rather than definite risk management 
strategies. However, their policy also limits the technologies 
of government, merely to use broader regulatory and policy 
measures. Addressing this gap in the literature, therefore, this 
paper examines the following research questions: (i) What 
are the calculative technologies imposed in the COVID-19 
response by the government of England? (ii) To what extent 
is the COVID-19 response as a set of calculative technologies 
different from what has happened before? (iii) What makes 
the governance of COVID-19 stand out regarding bio-politics? 
and (iv) Cross-referencing from other contexts, what are the 
implications of the application of calculative technologies? 
The study uses Foucault’s governmentality and bio-political 
scholarship15-18 to analyse the UK government’s population 
governance strategies executed during the first wave of 
COVID-19. Foucault’s governmentality refers to the ways in 
which the state exercises control over, or governs, the body 
of its population. In his discussions on the art of government, 
Foucault specifically discusses ‘bio-politics’ as the way for 
neo-liberal governments to manage their populations and 
administer the mechanics of life, eg, reproduction, births 
and mortality, health quality, life expectancy and safety and 
security, through broader technologies of government, such as 
statistical analysis and controls, population level regulations 
and surveillance mechanisms. Chatterjee19 argues that some 
governments (eg, post-colonial) can even use these rationally 
manipulated bio-political techniques, instruments and 
policies to frame their citizens as ‘subjects’ and favour some 
population groups over others. These broader ‘technologies 
of government,’ in the more visible and distinguishing 
sense, are involved and connected with rational calculative 
practices: the ‘technologies and procedures’ through which 
conceptions of proper modes of governing populations 
are developed ie, risk assessment, cost/budget calculation, 
performance management and accountability.20-23 The use of 
‘calculative techniques’23,24 as a controlling and surveillance 
mechanism in natural disaster situations, eg, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, bushfires, droughts and floods, is not a new 
topic and is discussed mainly in the disaster accounting 
Jayasinghe et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2021, x(x), 1–9 3
literature.25-32 Such practices are central to governmentality 
and bio-politics during COVID-19, the application of which 
creates a particular form of ‘public visibility’ and ‘rationale’ to 
events and activities such as “what is good, healthy, normal, 
virtuous, efficient or profitable” (p. 175), and make the society 
governable at a distance,21,23 with numbers, standards and 
metrices in the lives of individuals and the functioning of 
society. The paper interprets these COVID-19 related self-
governance reconfigurations enforced by the government as 
a bio-political intervention. 
Setting: The COVID-19 Context in the United Kingdom
As of July 21, 2021, a total of 5 723 422 infected cases and 
129 446 deaths were reported in the United Kingdom, the 
highest death rate among European countries.33 The UK 
government received criticism at a global level for its response 
to COVID-19. For instance, a report by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit34 reveals that the UK responses were 
among the worst, revealing a low score of 2.2 out of 4. The 
index considered three calculative measures of the quality of 
responses (tests, provision of non-COVID healthcare, death 
rate) and calculative risk factors (obesity prevalence, share of 
population age 65+, international arrivals). The report claims 
that “an insufficiently fast and co-ordinated response, an 
initial lack of testing capacity, and a decision to suspend track 
and trace in early March explain why the United Kingdom 
became an outlier.”34
As per the Global Health Security Index35, the United 
Kingdom was initially the second-best prepared country to 
respond to healthcare pandemics. The UK’s poor response to 
COVID-19 was therefore not anticipated. Public health experts 
claim that “there’s a reason the scorecard got it so wrong: it did 
not account for the political context in which a national policy 
response to a pandemic is formulated and implemented.”36 In 
addition to political reasons, compliance with World Health 
Organization (WHO) guidelines and calculative measures 
of ‘track and trace’ were poor in the United Kingdom. For 
instance, Dr. Jenny Harries, England’s Deputy Chief Medical 
Officer, commented on the relevance of WHO guidelines, 
stating, “The clue with WHO is in its title—it’s a World Health 
Organization and it is addressing all countries across the world, 
with entirely different health infrastructures.”36 Moreover, 
calculative practices such as the disproportionate impact of 
COVID infection rates of Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) communities, the non-prioritising of healthcare 
workers, misunderstanding of the difference between ‘science 
based’ and ‘political based’ decisions, and over reliance on the 
traditional concept based ‘preparedness,’ characterised the 
UK’s poor response to the pandemic.37
Methods
The study sourced secondary documents from reliable 
sources including government publications, parliamentary 
Hansards, the National Health Service (NHS) publications, 
and national newspapers. More specifically, the study ensures 
that key narratives are derived from well-established scientific 
sources, responsible individuals and respective government 
institutions. For instance, the document review was followed 
by the analysis of quotes by politicians, government officials, 
NHS staff members, scientists, public health experts, 
health policy-makers, COVID-19 patients, the general 
public, the media, the business community and the WHO 
representatives. The data sources focused only on the first 
wave of government responses from March 2020 to December 
2020. Additionally, the researchers observed events such as 
daily media conferences, parliamentary debates, government 
investigations, and political interventions that occurred 
during the same period. 
The study thus employs ‘critical thematic analysis’ to 
examine the interrelationships between the technologies 
of government and bio-politics.38-40 This approach helps 
identify the specific social construction of shared realities 
regarding the government’s bio-political projects. An open 
coding approach is used to develop the themes, having 
identified the experiences and perceptions of key actors in the 
published statements, media reports and public documents. 
The iterative process between data reduction and drawing 
and verifying conclusions conducted at various levels, eg, 
individual accounts, organisational and wider socio-political 
contexts, has proved useful in searching for the direct and 
indirect connections between calculative techniques and bio-
politics. The analysis derived five major themes, namely (i) 
justifying the government’s intervention in daily lives through 
accounts and matrices; (ii) calculative instruments used for 
governance; (iii) disciplining and policing the public; (iv) 
demonstrating public accountability through prioritisation 
and categorisation; and (v) criticisms of the government’s 
calculative measures. The primary coding process was 
commenced by two co-authors. During the process, some 
evidence overlapped between the government’s intervention 
in daily lives through accounts and matrices and the 
calculative instruments used for governance. However, after 
several in-depth discussions, all co-authors agreed on the five 
themes, based on the contextual setting and the availability of 
secondary data. The authors recurrently reviewed the research 
design, analysis and interpretation to agree on the conceptual 
and empirical alignment of themes and data sources.
Results
Numbers/Accounts and Matrices: The Rationales for Government 
Intervention in Public Lives
During the first wave of COVID-19 in England, the UK 
government employed statistics on the death toll, the 
reproduction number (R), and resource statistics and 
narratives to frame the public discourse around COVID-19 
and try to control spread of the virus. These numbers/statistics 
and matrices provided the ‘visibility’ for the daily events and 
crises faced by the public and also offered the rationale for the 
government’s undeviating interference in public lives during 
COVID-19. 
First, the total number of deaths from COVID-19 was used 
as a benchmark to assess and communicate the effectiveness 
of early responses. The United Kingdom had one of the 
highest COVID-19 death rates in the world. However, there 
were criticisms as to how different countries referred to 
different bases of reporting methods to count the death toll. 
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The UK government was of the view that the comparison of 
COVID-19 deaths across countries therefore did not reflect 
reality. Dominic Raab, the UK’s foreign minister, commented 
on the different approaches:
“There are different ways of counting deaths, as we know…
we’ve had that debate in this country. We now publish data 
that includes all deaths in all settings, and not all countries 
do that. So, I’m not sure that the international comparisons 
work unless you reliably know that all countries are 
measuring in the same way.”41 
The statistics on the death toll also created the visibility for 
public debate and criticism against the government. Using the 
death toll numbers and rationale, Professor Martin McKee 
from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
suggested that regardless of the differences between countries, 
the UK’s death toll rose mainly due to government delay in 
imposing lockdown:
“It’s actually quite simple…if we look at the countries that 
responded quickly and got in at the very beginning, they’re 
the ones that have managed to contain the epidemic.”41
Second, reducing the coronavirus reproduction (R) number 
was treated and communicated to the public as one of the 
key rationales to determine the transmission of the virus. 
The importance of maintaining R below 1 was emphasised, 
so that each existing infection would cause less than one 
new infection and thus help control the spread of the virus. 
Health authorities were very careful about the R number as 
it was a crucial measurement that would decide on lockdown 
restrictions. Professor McKee explained the link between 
lockdown and the R number:
“We typically think that one person infects between 2.5 
and 3 other people … Say they do that every day, they’ll infect 
3 then 9 then 27 and it goes up to about 20 000 in a matter 
of about 10 days. That’s the challenge: if you can get the R 
number down to 1.5 then you can reduce that number from 
20 000 additional cases down to about 40. So even a few days 
makes a huge difference.”41 
A low R number would have provided the government 
with the rationale to start easing the lockdown. Sticking 
to compliance with the lockdown was therefore urged. 
Commenting on the consequences of non-compliance with 
lockdown measures and its influence on the R number, 
Bournemouth East’s MP Tobias Ellwood remarked:
“Let’s not forget the pandemic is far from over. Rules may 
be relaxing but restrictions remain in place for a reason…
If they are ignored and the R value rises then tougher 
lockdown rules will return. Let’s stay alert to the dangers of 
COVID-19.”42 
Calculative Instruments Used for Governance at a Distance
Similar to many other countries (see eg, New Zealand), the 
UK government also used various calculative instruments to 
control public behaviour, as a way of reducing infection rates. 
First, the government announced ‘20 second hand washing 
with soap in warm water’ as a key healthcare principle that 
people should follow to prevent the spread of the virus and 
protect themselves. Hand washing was strongly advised after 
blowing the nose, sneezing, coughing, before having food, 
and immediately after returning home. In public places, 
people were advised to avoid touching their nose, eyes and 
mouth without hand washing. In the case of a cough or 
sneeze, the general public was asked to use a tissue or hand as 
appropriate, and clean their hands immediately afterwards.
Second, there was the practice of ‘maintaining a social 
distance of two metres’ to slow down the spread of the virus. 
In making the recommendation, science was referred to, 
based on the claim that respiratory droplets can travel up 
to 2 metres. The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
provided more clarity on social distancing: “staying away from 
mass gatherings and keeping a distance of 6 feet or 2 metres – 
about one body length – away from other people.”43 Thomas 
Perls, Professor of Medicine, Boston University, commented 
on the significance of the two-metre distance regulation:
 “It limits the number of people an infected person comes 
into contact with – and potentially spreads the virus to – 
before they even realize they have it.”43
Dr. Robin Thompson, Junior Research Fellow in 
Mathematical Epidemiology at the University of Oxford, 
referred to this calculative instrument of 2 metre social 
distancing as the reason for reduced transmission of the virus 
(33% fewer contacts) from 1093 (without social distancing) 
to 127 cases within six weeks.44 Health authorities also used 
this instrument of ‘complying with the social distancing 
regulations’ as the basis for demanding that individuals 
play a critical role in substantially reducing the spread of 
virus. The failure to adhere to the ‘1-metre-plus’ instrument 
was also used by the health authorities to rationalise and 
communicate their healthcare resource issues to the public. 
It was announced publicly that the healthcare facilities to 
manage the number of cases, known as flattening the curve, 
was challenging.
“If the number of cases isn’t kept below what the healthcare 
system can handle at any one time – called flattening the 
curve – hospitals could become overwhelmed, leading to 
unnecessary deaths and suffering.”43
Using the ‘level of the spread of the virus’ as a calculative 
measure, later the government also prohibited public 
gatherings of more than two family units. Group gatherings 
were limited to 6 members. In order to make the public more 
disciplined and controlled, the government announced that 
those who did not comply with these requirements were 
subject to fines. 
Third, ‘self-isolation’ (quarantine) was a key calculative 
instrument of the UK government’s strategy to minimize 
the spread of the virus. The scientifically chosen numbers/
statistics and narratives were added to this instrument for 
creating public acceptance and visibility. For individuals 
showing symptoms, health authorities advised them to 
self-isolate for seven days from the day symptoms started. 
After contact with an infected person, household members 
were required to stay at home for 14 days. Individuals with 
underlying medical conditions were advised, if possible, to 
take extra steps to protect themselves (shielding). Individuals 
with symptoms were not allowed to attend GP surgeries, 
pharmacies or hospitals. Individuals were requested to use 
the NHS online service or make a call only for urgent medical 
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help. Referring to the calculative instrument of self-isolation, 
the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson advised the general 
public to self-isolate after being infected by the virus:
“…on the advice of the Chief Medical Officer, I’ve taken a 
test that has come out positive, so I am working from home. 
I’m self-isolating and that’s entirely the right thing to do... So, 
thank you to everybody who’s doing what I’m doing, working 
from home to stop the spread of the virus from household to 
household.”45
Fourth, with the number of infections increasing, the 
government then added another phrase to the ‘social 
distancing’ instrument, to ‘restrict outdoor exercise.’ 
Considering the limited access to parks and back gardens, the 
government decided to allow one hour, outdoor workouts per 
day for the general public. This newly introduced ‘outdoor 
restrictions’ instrument, however, received some criticisms 
from the public. Linda Bauld, Professor of Public Health at 
the University of Edinburgh, commented on the severe and 
increasingly complex implications due to restricted outdoor 
activities:
 “The health implications of the lockdown that we anticipate 
– increased alcohol consumption, domestic violence, anxiety 
and depression, poor diet and decreased physical activity - 
will get worse if we confine more of us to our homes, without 
the hugely important respite that outdoor exercise provides.”46
Disciplining and Punishing the Public Through Performance 
Measures and Controls 
In order to create self-governable and comparable individuals, 
the government imposed strict behavioural control measures, 
such as lockdown compliance and non-compliance fines for 
the public.
First, by declaring a national emergency, the government 
instructed the public to ‘stay at home’ and restrict their 
everyday movements, with four exceptions: infrequent 
shopping for basic needs (eg, food and medicine), one hour, 
outdoor workouts, supporting vulnerable people, and for 
travel to and from work where the job could not be done 
from home. Except for members of the same household, 
public gatherings of more than two people were banned. 
While funerals were allowed with limited participation, all 
wedding ceremonies and sports events were cancelled. While 
government guidelines were necessary to reduce the spread 
of the virus, some people felt that it was quite challenging to 
adhere to these government imposed ‘behavioural controls’ in 
everyday life due to various practical issues, such as economic 
and psychological breakdowns. For instance, a pharmacist 
commented that:
“I was working in a pharmacy yesterday and a member of 
staff broke down. Same happened last week: I was working 
in a pharmacy, I had to make a member of staff a cup of 
tea because they’d broken down. They just cannot cope…
We need tighter guidance on what constitutes ‘essential’ and 
enforcement measures.”47
Second, the government decided to impose a minimum £30 
fine on those who did not respect and comply with lockdown 
rules and warned that this would rise significantly for further 
offences.42 The BBC reported that as per the The National 
Police Chiefs’ Council figures, 15 552 fines had been recorded 
by May 29, 2020 in violation of social distancing regulations. 
The government instructed the police to employ a four-step 
systematic approach (Engage. Explain. Encourage. Enforce) 
to make people understand the need for the regulations and 
to maintain control of the situation.48 The failure to pay the 
fine resulted in legal consequences with court involvement 
and ultimately, payment of the fine. For instance, in England, 
people aged 18 or above were fined £100 for the first offence, 
reduced to £50 if paid within two weeks. The second offence 
would be £200, doubling for subsequent offences to a 
maximum of £3200. Vikki Slade, the Liberal Democrat leader 
of Bournemouth Council, commented that regardless of the 
various efforts taken by the council, people did not comply 
with the rules and did not respect the community.
 “It doesn’t matter what we do, these vile idiots will ignore 
rules … disgusting.”49
For instance, the Cheltenham festival was criticised by some 
who claimed that the event would become an epicentre of the 
pandemic. Around 150 000 people took part in the four-day 
event ten days before the lockdown. These results demonstrate 
the underlying difficulties of using ‘authoritarian’ behavioural 
controls to govern people’s everyday lives. 
Construction of “Public Accountability” Through Prioritisation 
and Categorisation 
Similar to other countries,50 the government thus used some 
carefully chosen ‘calculative measures’ such as prioritization 
and categorization of healthcare staff and clinically extremely 
vulnerable individuals for preferential treatment, to 
demonstrate their moral responsibility and ‘accountability to 
the public.’ The government used the calculative technology 
of ‘risk assessment’ to rationally identify and group these 
people. 
First, the government defined and prioritised a certain 
number of professions as key workers during the pandemic, 
including frontline NHS staff, all healthcare professionals 
(eg, pharmacists), teachers and those who were engaged 
in delivering essential services. Key workers were put 
into priority groups. For instance, large stores announced 
dedicated hours for NHS staff. In addition, key workers were 
prioritised for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing, 
could send their children to school, ask for discounts, and 
apply for a driving licence, to name a few. Highlighting the 
importance of prioritising the key workers, Ruth Rankine, the 
director of primary care at NHS Confederation, commented:
“Many frontline staff are ‘really, really scared’…When they 
go in and see a patient... even though they’re not displaying 
symptoms, they may still have the virus…We are seeing 
increasing numbers of primary care workforce going off sick 
as a result.”51
 Second, in order to shield vulnerable individuals, the NHS 
categorised them according to two levels of higher risk that 
would require extra attention during the pandemic. The 
high-risk group included clinically extremely vulnerable 
individuals with underlying medical conditions (eg, over 80 
years). The moderate risk group included clinically vulnerable 
individuals (eg, above 70 years). Termed as ‘shielding,’ 
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vulnerable individuals were then strongly advised with some 
specifically targeted ‘calculative measures,’ such as to stay at 
home whenever possible, keep outside visitors to a minimum 
and strictly comply with the healthcare guidelines. Further, 
the clinically extremely vulnerable individuals were advised 
not to be a part of the ‘support bubbles’ which were created 
among other households.
Criticisms of the UK Government’s Use of Calculative 
Technologies 
In several instances, the UK government’s COVID-19 policies 
made visible to the public through calculative technologies 
encountered challenges in their implementation. This resulted 
in growing public criticism of the government’s handling of 
COVID-19. 
First, the Prime Minister and his ministers were criticised 
and questioned over a lack of clarity from the government 
with regard to the COVID-19 guidelines, including social 
distancing instruments and measures. For instance, the BBC 
reported contradictory views expressed by the government: 
“only jog for 30 minutes,” “children should not travel between 
parents,” “you can shop once a week,” “people should leave 
the house once, if possible.”52 Moreover, there were criticisms 
against public office holders for not complying with the social 
distancing rules. For instance, the former Cabinet Secretary, 
Gus O’Donnell, urged politicians to set an example to the 
public by complying with the regulations:
“They do need to learn a lesson from this and actually 
obey their own rules much more strictly.”52
The media also reported how council workers were being 
physically and verbally abused while implementing the 
lockdown restrictions, because of the lack of transparency 
and public awareness on some of its guidlines.47 “Workers 
have been spat at, sworn at and racially abused.”47
Second, the government was also criticised for not adopting 
specifically targeted calculative measures to protect vulnerable 
groups in care homes where the majority of deaths were 
recorded. Responding to a question about this, the Prime 
Minister claimed that:
“Too many care homes didn’t really follow the ‘procedures’ 
in the way that they could have.”53
The National Care Forum commented that these allegations 
were “frankly hugely insulting … clumsy and cowardly.”54 
Labour’s shadow health secretary, Jonathan Ashworth, 
highlighted several shortcomings in calculative technologies 
of COVID-19 that led to the high death toll in care homes:
“Care providers were sent conflicting guidance throughout 
this outbreak, staff could not access testing until mid-April 
and are still not tested routinely, PPE [personal protective 
equipment] supplies have been inadequate, thousands 
of families have lost their loved ones in care homes to this 
disease, care workers themselves have died on the front line.”54
Third, the numbers produced by calculations, eg, 
COVID-19 risk analysis and cluster analysis of infected 
people in the population, indicated existing healthcare 
inequalities in the United Kingdom. Particularly, the BAME 
community appeared to be particularly vulnerable and 
‘disproportionately’ affected by COVID-19 mortality and 
morbidity rates. The public health review reports that the 
highest age standardised infection rates per 100 000 people 
were among BAME communities (486 in females and 649 in 
males) and the lowest was among white ethnic groups (220 
in females and 224 in males). People of Bangladeshi ethnicity 
were reported as twice as much at risk of death than people 
with British white ethnicity. At the same time, other ethnicities 
such as Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, and other individuals with 
Asian, Caribbean and African backgrounds also reported a 
10%-50% higher death risk compared with British white 
individuals. The number of deaths among NHS-BAME staff 
was widely discussed, with several explanations being given. 
The BBC highlighted key underlying factors:
“The unequal impact may be explained by social and 
economic inequalities, racism, discrimination and stigma, 
differing risks at work and inequalities in the prevalence 
of conditions such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension and 
asthma, which can increase the severity of Covid-19.”55
In particular, the PHE review report reveals that historical 
racism largely prevents BAME staff members seeking PPE 
and necessary healthcare services when needed.
“…historical racism may make BAME individuals less 
likely to seek care when needed or, as NHS staff, to speak up 
when they have concerns about PPE or increased risk.”56
This signified the unequal results of COVID-19 governance 
in the United Kingdom, as some citizens are better at 
utilizing their agency for demanding public goods, and that 
marginalised others are less willing or able to do so, because 
of different socio-economic factors. Rehana Azam, GMB 
National Secretary commented that:
“Equally obviously, structural inequality could ultimately 
be to blame. If an ethnic group is at higher risk because of 
overcrowded housing, deprivation or poorer general health 
rather than strictly race, that is still a finding that many 
people will find troubling.”57
In response to these public criticisms, the NHS introduced a 
new calculative technology for healthcare workers, designated 
as ‘COVID-19 Risk Reduction Framework.’ The framework 
consisted of workplace, workforce and individual assessment 
criteria, measures and instruments. Four underlying factors 
were particularly considered in individual risk assessments: 
age and ethnicity, sex, underlying health conditions and 
pregnancy.
Discussion
The results/findings above demonstrate the role that calculative 
technologies20-23 played in the COVID-19 responses by the 
government of England and how they made the governance 
of COVID-19 stand out with regard to bio-politics. While 
pandemics such as COVID-19 are not common, the way 
the governments give them meaning through ‘calculative 
practices’ have been challenging and ongoing. Thus, findings 
of this study demonstrate how the UK government forced 
their citizens to pursue prescribed and often standardized 
targets, calculative instruments and measures in their 
everyday lives and in so doing, they were brought under the 
regime of governmentality.58-61 These calculative measures 
and instruments, eg, 2 metre social distancing, restriction 
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to their everyday life movements and the imposition of fines 
on those who did not comply with public rules made the 
public self-responsible for mitigating the risk of COVID-19 
infection, and then subsequently safeguard their living. These 
bio-political initiatives made the government widen their 
base by which citizens’ life was governed at a distance, and so, 
successfully gained bio-power over its citizens.15-18 These were 
socially marketed as kinds of obligations and a way to protect 
themselves and vulnerable groups during the pandemic.55,59 
However, COVID-19 also shed light on existing healthcare 
inequalities, even though the UK government attempted 
to communicate their public accountability via some 
calculative measures such as prioritisation and categorisation 
of healthcare staff and vulnerable people for preferential 
treatments. The calculative analysis such as risk measurement 
thus indicated that life-prolonging decisions have only been 
possible or available for certain citizens, whereas in others, eg, 
BAME, the COVID-19 responses have not treated all citizens 
equally. 
This new and temporary environment inevitably created 
by COVID-19 thus emerged as a key site for bio-politics, 
involving obligations, entitlements across different fields 
and scales of engagement by the public.19 As results/findings 
suggest, this UK government’s approach of governing 
at a distance increasingly considers the individual as an 
autonomous agent (subject) who self-monitors and exercises 
his/her agency in order to mitigate external risks.15-18The 
logics of ‘countability’ and ‘measurement,’ eg, comparative 
death tolls, infection rates and coronavirus R (Reproduction) 
number, lockdown rules such as one hour outdoor workout, 
limited participation in events have been used as the tell-
tale ‘bio-political’ mechanisms of life management and 
governmentality. In other words, these self-governing 
calculative technologies enacted by the government created 
some self-disciplined limits and also police-administered 
‘punishments,’ eg, fines to lockdown rule breakers, with the 
promise of safe-guarding people’s lives.15-18,21,23 Thus, citizens 
were made privately accountable to themselves (self) and also 
publicly, to their families and fellow community members. 
By using these widely communicated numbers/matrices, 
calculative measures and instruments, the UK government 
created a bio-politically driven public discourse during 
COVID-19 that ‘life can be managed through calculations.’
Conclusion
This paper examined how the government of England 
deployed calculative technologies to govern their citizens, 
particularly during the first wave of COVID-19. Foucauldian 
literature on COVID-19 in other countries,5-10 and the general 
COVID-19 literature in the United Kingdom,1-4 forgets the 
importance of explicitly and distinctively used calculative 
technologies in COVID-19 governance. Instead, their works 
largely refer to broader technologies of government and 
also bio-political analysis of COVID-19. In particular, the 
studies beyond the UK address the complex set of ‘liberal’ 
and/or ‘coercive’ technologies that are used to rationalize 
the political power of governments, but without an explicit 
and distinguishing explanation of the role and importance 
of calculative technologies.6,7 In contrast, most of the UK 
studies focus on the managerial and decision-making 
aspects of COVID-19, without an emphasis on bio-political 
implications.3 Therefore, researchers should take note that 
an important empirical contribution could be to implement 
‘calculative’ researches to avoid such a potential mistake, and 
consider this approach as a significant part of government 
technology, as detailed in this paper.
The paper also elaborated on the transformative nature 
of calculative technologies. Thus, the set of calculative 
technologies used in the COVID-19 response in the United 
Kingdom produced an incrementally changed approach 
from the past health emergency governance systems, eg, 
the NHS in the United Kingdom. This new system that 
attempted to deal with the temporal environment created 
by COVID-19 adopted a tailor-made approach to target and 
prioritise specific population categories. Also, this ‘temporal 
environment’ required more self-governance principles for 
citizens compared to the past liberal governance rules; the 
COVID-19 governance in the United Kingdom stands out 
very much regarding the bio-politics implemented through 
authoritarian principles: self-discipline and punishment. 
Regarding future implications, when cross-referencing 
with other contexts, the government must focus more on 
introducing a set of calculative technologies within their 
broader technologies of government, specifically targeting 
vulnerable communities, eg, ethnic minority groups, in order 
to create better social justice and public accountability. The 
study’s findings also suggest that the UK government must 
attempt to enact a better ‘health and recovery’ environment, 
eg, adequate funding and resources for the NHS, rather 
than focusing on its self-governance strategies and political 
controls over its citizens as ‘subjects.’19 
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